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Abstract 
 
E-system, a new commerce model, is a new era for 
business direction.  When a principal is absent (goes on 
an errand or on leave), a well-designed deputy system 
keeps the business operations working.  In the network 
world, identity verification and any substitute for 
traditional signature can be done by digital signature [1].  
Deputy signature guarantees the existence of deputy 
system in e-system.  Current deputy mechanism 
addresses the verification of deputy signature.  No 
research has been done on the prevention of the illegal 
use of deputy system when the principal returns and the 
deputy system is not in use.  We propose a mechanism 
to solve the problem of illegal use of deputy system 
when the power of deputy system is not legally “ON.” 
Key words: information security, digital signature, 
deputy signature. 
 
1. Introduction 
    In the information era, information technology is 
an important tool to support all work.  The popularity 
of network changes the methods of information transfer 
and speeds up the development of e-commerce.  As a 
new model of commerce, e-commercialization is a 
competitive goal for all business users.  A 
well-designed deputy system is helpful to business 
operations in non-network system and is imperative in 
network system. 
    In a network environment, in addition to verifying 
the identity, digital signature can also be used to 
substitute for the traditional handwritten signature.   
During the principal’s absence, deputy signature keeps 
the system running and the security of private key as 
well. The characteristics of deputy signature are as 
follows: private, identifiable, secure, and undeniable.  
Current deputy mechanism addresses the verification of 
deputy signature.  No research has been done on the 
prevention of the illegal use of deputy system when 
deputy system is not in use.  We propose a mechanism 
to solve the problem of illegal use of deputy system 
when the power of deputy system is not legally “ON.”  
Our scheme provides a delegation time schedule for the 
receiver to solve the associated problem of deputy 
signature.  Unauthorized deputy will be ruled out once 
the principal returns and the deputy’s authority has 
lapsed. 
    The layout of this paper is as follows.  Literature 
review is in Section 2.  Section 3 introduces our 
scheme.  In Section 4, we analyze the security of our 
scheme.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
    Digital signature fulfills the requirement of 
signature in network environment and enhances the 
feasibility of e-commerce.  In the E-era, the 
un-deniability of digital signature enables e-documents 
to be widely and legally accepted.  The principal uses 
his/her private key to sign and send documents.  The 
receivers verify the documents by public key.  When 
one cannot sign documents personally, deputy signature 
enables the deputy to keep the system working without 
using the original private key.    Mambo et al [2,3] 
propose deputy signature in 1996.  Deputy signature 
allows deputy to sign documents with equal efficacy.  
In general, deputy signature has properties as follows 
[11]: 
A. Distinguish-ability: The difference between deputy 
signature and original signature is distinguishable. 
B. Unforgeability: No one else can forge deputy 
signature other than the real deputy.  
C. Verifiability: The receiver(s) can believe that the 
principal agrees to deputy signature for the 
documents. 
D. Un-deniability: deputy cannot deny deputy signature. 
Unfortunately, the Mambo deputy signature is 
deniable.  Zhang [4], Lee et al [5], Sun and Hsieh [6] 
solve this problem in their schemes . 
  
3. Our Scheme 
 
3.1 Registration 
First, firm should set up a system center.  The 
manager of system center chooses a big prime p [7,8,9] 
to satisfy the following equations: 
14 11 += qpp  
where 1p , 1q  are big primes. 
Let 11qpn =  
Then, select a number g modulo p with order n, i.e., 
gn≡ 1 (mod p), ( )pg p mod11 ≠ , ( )pg q mod11 ≠ . 
  
{p,n,g} is the public key of the system center. { }11, qp  
is private key. 
The principal (hereafter A) selects a number *nA Zx ∈ , 
calculates:   ( )pgy AxA mod≡ ………(1) 
and registers to system center.  { }Ay { }Ax  are the 
public key of A  and private key, respectively. 
If A is to assign B as his/her deputy to sign documents 
during [ ]21, ttTA = .  B selects a number *nB Zx ∈ ，
calculates:  
( )pgy BxB mod≡ ………(2) 
and registers to system center, where { }By { }Bx  are 
the public key of B  and private key, respectively. 
 
3.2 Delegation 
Step 1: A selects a number *1 nZd ∈  and calculates: 
 ( )pgD d mod11 ≡ ………(3) 
Step 2: Calculate: 
 ( )nEdDxTy AAB mod111 +≡+ ..……(4) 
Step 3: Send deputy certificate { }11,, EDTA  to B as 
shown in Diagram 1. 
 
3.3 Generation of deputy signature 
If B is going to sign on the message m during 
deputy time, 
Step 1: Select a number *2 nZd ∈  and calculate: 
 ( )pgD d mod22 ≡ ………(5) 
Step 2: Calculate: 
 ( )pDdmxE B mod222 +≡ ……….(6) 
Step 3: Sending deputy certificate { }11,, EDTA  and 
the digital signature { }22 ,, EDm  with 
message m to a receiver C as shown in 
Diagram 2. 
 
3.4 Verification of deputy signature 
The receiver C  verifies: 
 
( )pDyg EDTy AB mod11 10≡+ ………(7) 
( )pDyg DmBE mod22 2≡ …………(8) 
If the equations above are valid, accept deputy B .  If 
not, reject. 
 
4. Security Analyses 
Theorem 1: If A is honest, Eqs.(7)(8) are valid.  
Proof: 
To have base g for the both sides of Eq.(4) and obtain: ( )pggg EdDxTy AAB mod111≡+  
( )pDy EDA mod11 1≡  
According to Eqs.(1)(3) 
For the same reason, having base g for both sides of 
Eq.(6) and obtaining: ( )pggg DdmxE B mod222 ≡  
  ( )pDy DmB mod22≡  
According to Eqs.(2)(5), the theorem 1 is proven. 
 
Theorem 2: The difficulty of forging Eq.(1) is the 
complexity of discrete logarithm 
Proof: 
ElGamal [10] has proven that following equations to be 
discrete logarithm: ( )pryg srm mod≡ ………(9) 
Comparing Eq.(7) and Eq.(9), we find that if  ( )nmTy AB mod≡+  ………(10) 
Principal ADeputy B
{ }11,, EDTA
Sending deputy certificate：
Select　　　，
Calculate：　　
　　
*
1 nZd ∈
( )pgD d mod11 ≡ ( )nEdDxTy AAB mod111 +≡+
Diagram 1: Delegating deputy and sending deputy 
certificate 
Receiver CDeputy B
Sending deputy certificate　　　　
and message
{ }11,, EDTA{ }22 ,, EDm
Select 　　　，
calculate　　　　　
and　　　　　　
*
2 nZd ∈
( )pgD d mod22 ≡ ( )pDdmxE B mod222 +≡
Diagram 2: Running of Deputy signature 
  
then Eq.(7) is similar to Eq.(9).  Namely, the 
complexity of Eq.(9) is discrete logarithm.  So is 
Eq.(10).  On the contrary, if Eq.(10) is the problem of 
discrete logarithm, So is Eq.(9).  In addition, the 
complexity of forging Eq.(8) is at least equal to the 
complexity of Eq.(7).  The proof is similar and omitted.  
Thus, theorem 2 is proven.     
From the two theorems above, we know that if an 
attacker (A or B) is going to invade our system, he/she 
has to solve the complexity of discrete logarithm.  
 
5. Conclusion 
    In recent years, along with the development of 
network, e-commerce is expanding rapidly.  In addition 
to overturning the traditional model of transactions, this 
new business activity also provides ample business 
opportunity.  Network is used for business activities 
and generates e-business.  For e-business, information 
security is an important topic.  In a non-e environment, 
deputy system can be done by written delegation 
certificate.  In an e-environment, a trustable deputy 
signature is needed.  Our deputy signature has the 
advantage of timing for the verification of deputy 
signature.  No illegal deputy can be accepted once the 
principal returns and the deputy’s authority has lapsed. 
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